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THE FACTS 
 
In June 2003 Werner Mangold, who was 56 years old, concluded a fixed-
term contract of employment with Rüdiger Helm. The contract provided that 
its duration was based on para 14(3) of the TzBfG (German Law on Part-
Time and Fixed-Term Employment) which was intended to facilitate the 
fixed-term employment of older workers (those over the age of 52). A few 
weeks into his employment, Mangold brought proceedings against Helm 
before the Arbeitsgericht München (Munich Labour Court) claiming that the 
clause fixing the duration of his employment was void in that para 14(3) of 
the TzBfG, on which it was based, was incompatible with Council Directive 
1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP and Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and education. 
Council Directive 1999/70, concerning the framework agreement on 
fixed-term work, requires Member States to introduce measures to prevent 
abuse through successive use of fixed-term contracts (clause 5) and provides 
that its implementation should not constitute valid grounds for reducing the 
general level of protection afforded to workers (clause 8(3)). Council 
Directive 2000/78, establishes a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on 
the grounds of, inter alia, age (art 2). However, it also provides that: 
 
 “Member States may provide that differences of treatment on 
grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination if, within 
the context of national law, they are objectively and 
reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate 
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employment policy, labour market and vocational training 
objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary” (art 6(1)). 
 
 Germany had exercised an option of an extended implementation period 
and therefore has to implement this Directive by 2 December 2006. 
The TzBfG, which was introduced in 2000 to implement Directive 
1999/70, required the objective justification of fixed-term contracts. It was 
however amended in 2002 to allow the use of fixed-term contracts without 
such justification in the case of workers over the age of 52 (previously 56), to 
encourage the employment of older workers. This provision will expire on 31 
December 2006, a few weeks after the date by which Germany must have 
transposed Directive 2000/78. The Arbeitsgericht München sought a 
preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice as to the compatibility 
of the domestic legislation as applied to workers over the age of 52 with 
clauses 5 and 8(3) of the Framework Agreement (Council Directive 1999/70) 
and art 6(1) of Council Directive 2000/78. 
 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE  
 
The ECJ held: 
 
1. Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement (Council Directive 1999/70) 
was irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute of the national court in that the 
dispute concerned a single contract as opposed to “the use of successive fixed-
term employment contracts.” [41] – [43] 
 
2. Clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement (Council Directive 1999/70) 
did not prohibit domestic legislation lowering the age above which fixed-term 
contracts of employment may be concluded without objective justification, in 
that the latter was passed irrespective of the implementation of that 
Agreement and for reasons connected with the separate need to encourage 
employment. [52] – [54] 
 
3. The purpose of Directive 2000/78 is to lay down a general framework 
for combating discrimination on any of the grounds referred to in art 1, which 
include age, as regards employment and occupation. Para. 14(3) of the 
TzBfG, by permitting employers to conclude without restriction fixed-term 
contracts of employment with workers over the age of 52, introduces a 
difference in treatment on the grounds directly of age. However, the purpose 
of that legislation was plainly to promote the vocational integration of 
unemployed older workers, in so far as they encounter considerable 
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difficulties in finding work. An objective of that kind must as a rule be 
regarded as justifying, “objectively and reasonably”, a difference of treatment 
on grounds of age as permitted by art 6(1) of Directive 2000/78. [56] – [57], 
[59], [61] 
 
4. Art 6(1) requires the means used to achieve that legitimate objective to 
be “appropriate and necessary”. Member States enjoy broad discretion in their 
choice of the measures capable of attaining their objectives in the field of 
social and employment policy. However, in so far as the domestic legislation 
at issue takes the age of the worker as the only criterion for the application of 
a fixed-term contract of employment, when it has not been shown that fixing 
an age threshold, as such, regardless of any other consideration linked to the 
structure of the labour market in question or the personal situation of the 
person concerned, is objectively necessary to the attainment of the objective 
which is the vocational integration of unemployed older workers, it must be 
considered to go beyond what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain 
the objective pursed.  Observance of the principle of proportionality requires 
every derogation from an individual right to reconcile, so far as possible, the 
requirements of the principle of equal treatment with those of the aim 
pursued. Such national legislation cannot, therefore, be justified under art 6(1) 
of Directive 2000/78. [62-63], [65] 
 
5. During the period prescribed for the transposition into domestic law of 
a directive, the Member States must refrain from taking any measures liable 
seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that 
directive. It is immaterial whether or not the rule of domestic law in question, 
adopted after the directive entered into force, is concerned with the 
transposition of the directive.  The mere fact that the rule of domestic law was 
to expire on December 31, 2006, just a few weeks after the date by which the 
Member States had to have transposed the directive, was not in itself decisive. 
[67] – [69] 
 
6. A Member State which exceptionally enjoys an extended period for 
transposition, is progressively to take concrete measures for the purposes of 
there and then approximating its legislation to the result prescribed by that 
directive. That obligation would be rendered redundant if the Member States 
were to be permitted, during the period allowed for implementation of the 
directive, to adopt measures incompatible with the objectives pursued by that 
act. [72] 
 
7. Directive 2000/78 does not itself lay down the principle of equal 
treatment in the field of employment and occupation. The principle of non-
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discrimination on grounds of age must be regarded as a general principle of 
Community law. Consequently observance of the general principle of equal 
treatment, in particular in respect of age, cannot as such be conditional upon 
the expiry of the period allowed the Member States for transposition of a 
directive intended to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of age. [74 – [76] 
 
8. It is the responsibility of the national court to guarantee the full 
effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, 
setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with 
Community law, even where the period prescribed for transposition of that 
directive has not yet expired. [78] 
 
COMMENTARY 
 
If ever a judgment of the Court of Justice purporting to ensure the full 
effectiveness of community law would cause the disapproval of the academic 
opinion, then Mangold certainly would be that case. Mangold is a 
revolutionary judgment. It breaks new ground. It marks a path through the 
existing well-traversed terrain of direct effect of directives finding yet another 
way round what have been its well-established features: the lack of horizontal 
direct effect of directives and the lack of enforcement of directive-based rights 
prior to the expiry of the implementation period of the directive. The 
reasoning put forward for such new inroads is itself new: the idea that the 
Directive embodies a pre-existing general principle and that national law 
could therefore be set aside by national courts, even though the 
implementation period for the Directive had not expired. It is however 
unconvincing and its impact on this already convoluted area of European law 
disquieting.  
The Court of Justice in this case found that the German legislation 
allowing fixed term employment contracts to be used in the case of employees 
over the age of 52 without objective justification, pursued a legitimate 
objective permitted by Council Directive 2000/78.1 Although it created a 
difference in treatment on the grounds of age, it promoted the employment of 
older workers who experience greater difficulty in finding employment, a 
legitimate justification under the Directive. The legislation was however 
found to be incompatible with the Directive in that it failed the test of 
proportionality, which was strictly applied by the Court. The Court found that, 
contrary to the principle of proportionality, the national legislation went 
1  Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and education, O J 2000, L303/16. 
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beyond what was appropriate and necessary to achieve its objective of 
enhancing the employability of older workers. It objected to the fact that age 
was the sole criterion for applying the fixed-term contract without restriction, 
which meant all workers above 52, whether they were unemployed or not 
before then, could be offered fixed-term contracts renewable until the age of 
retirement without restriction. Without referring to the personal circumstances 
of the worker concerned, the legislation would therefore apply the difference 
in treatment in all cases, even in cases when its objective did not really apply. 
In that sense it was inappropriate and unnecessary and thus disproportionate. 
But the most interesting and important aspects of the Court’s decision 
relate to the consequences of such an infringement of age discrimination 
Directive provisions.    
 
Effect / Consequences of a directive during transposition period 
 
The Court’s decision obliged the national court to set aside the national 
law infringing the directive. The problem created by this is that at the relevant 
time the deadline for transposition of that directive had not yet passed. This 
was not the first time however that the Court had dealt with directives and 
their effects before their implementation time limit had expired. Very early on 
in its jurisprudence the Court had been asked in the case of Ratti2 whether a 
Directive could be relied on by an individual before the time limit for its 
implementation had expired and it made it clear that it could not. 
 
“It follows that…it is only at the end of the prescribed period 
and in the event of the Member State’s default that the 
directive…will be able to have the effects described in the 
answer to the first question. Until that date the Member State 
remains free in that field.”3
 
Although Mangold entered the fixed-term contract in June 2003 and the 
implementation period of the Directive would not expire until December 
2006, the Court did allow reliance on the Directive to disapply contrary 
national law. Mangold would therefore effectively enjoy the benefits of non-
discrimination that the Directive had intended before the end of the prescribed 
period, which does not sit comfortably with the above settled case law. 
The Court justifies its decision by firstly, relying on the principle that 
during the period prescribed for the transposition into domestic law of a 
directive, the Member States must refrain from taking any measures 
2  Case 148/79, Pubblico Ministero v Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629. 
3  Ibid at paragraphs [43] – [44]. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
238 
                                                     
“measures liable seriously to compromise” the attainment of the result 
prescribed by that directive, a principle first established in the case of Inter-
Environnement Wallonie. 4 But the extent to which the national law here 
would seriously compromise the attainment of the directive’s intended result, 
particularly considering it would lapse shortly after the Directive would come 
into force, is highly doubtful. Notably the Court does not even refer to its own 
recent explanation that the above Wallonie obligation does not give 
individuals the right to rely on the directive during the implementation period, 
as was the effect of its decision here. In Rieser it had explained that: 
 
“…during the period [of implementation], the Member States 
were required to refrain from taking any measures liable 
gravely to jeopardise the attainment of the result prescribed 
by Directive [1999/62] but that individuals could not rely on 
that Directive against the Member States before national 
courts in order to have a pre-existing national rule 
incompatible with the Directive disapplied.”5
 
If the obligation in Wallonie cannot be relied on by individuals against 
the State to disapply national law as Rieser seems to suggest, it is even less 
likely that it can be relied against a private party as the Court purports to do in 
Mangold.6 If directives cannot be relied on in proceedings between private 
parties, it is unclear how they could be relied on against an individual to 
disapply national law. It is therefore puzzling that the Court’s decision seems 
to achieve that result.  
The Court’s line of reasoning based on the obligation set out in Wallonie 
is therefore problematic. Even if the national legislation could be found to 
“seriously compromise” the Directive’s result, which as explained above is 
itself doubtful, it would be highly unlikely that the obligation to disapply it 
could be enforced horizontally as against an individual. Advocate General 
Tizzano himself does not accept this possibility.7  
The Court, perhaps not itself convinced by the strength of the argument 
based on Wallonie, then goes on to place particular importance on the fact that 
Germany had an extended period of implementation coupled with an 
obligation to report annually to the Commission “on the steps it is taking to 
4  Case C-129/96, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Region Wallone, [1997] 
ECR I-7411. 
5  Case C-157/02, Rieser Internationale Transporte GmbH v Autobahnen, O J C 71, 
20.03.2004, p 4 at para [69]. 
6 See below the discussion on the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. 
7 Mangold, Opinion of AG Tizzano, at paras  [111]. 
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tackle age…discrimination,”8 which it interpreted to mean Germany could not 
introduce measures contrary to the Directive during the period of 
implementation. What remains unclear from the Court’s judgment is whether 
the deviation from traditional Ratti reasoning will be dependant on the 
existence of such undertakings by Member States expressed in the text of the 
Directive or will be applied more widely under a general application of the 
principle in Inter-Environnement Wallonie. 
 
Yet another way round horizontal direct effect?  
 
The most important and revolutionary aspect of the Court’s judgment, 
however, relates to the fact that the disapplication of the national law at issue 
would effectively create obligations on individuals; employers would be 
prohibited from entering into unrestricted fixed-term contracts of employment 
with workers over the age of 52, a right clearly given by the national law 
which is inconsistent with the Directive. It is effectively the Directive that 
prevents such individuals from relying on their national law right and 
imposing obligations on them – something highly inconsistent with settled 
case law of the Court on the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. 
The Court has consistently held that directives are Community acts 
imposing obligations exclusively on Member States.9  As it originally stated 
in Marshall No  1: 
 
“With regard to the argument that a directive may not be 
relied upon against an individual, it must be emphasized that 
according to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty [now Article 249 
of the EC Treaty], the binding nature of a directive, which 
constitutes the basis for the possibility of relying on the 
directive before a national court, exists only in relation to 
‘each member state to which it is addressed.’ It follows that a 
directive may not of itself impose obligations on an 
individual and that a provision of a directive may not be 
relied upon as such against an individual.”10
 
8  Directive 2000/78, above  note 1, article 18. 
9 See in particular Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire 
Area Health Authority, [1986] ECR 723, at para [48]; Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v 
Recreb, [1994] ECR I-3325, at para [20]; and Case C-201/02, Case C-201/02, Delena 
Wells v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, [2004] 
ECR I-723, at para[56]; Bernhard Pfeiffer and others v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, at 
para [16]. 
10  Marshall, ibid note 8, at para [48]. 
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By disallowing the horizontal direct effect of directives – the imposing of 
directive – derived obligations on individuals which can be enforced in 
actions by other individuals – the Court had to accept the unpalatable 
consequence that if the state failed to introduce implementing legislation, the 
courts had to continue applying incompatible national law in actions against 
individuals. In order to counteract the threat that this would pose to the 
effectiveness of community law, the Court has over the years devised 
ingenious judicial mechanisms to give directives some effect in horizontal 
scenarios. 
The first way the Court found to reduce the rigour of the rule of no 
horizontal direct effect of directives was to expand the remit of vertical direct 
effect – actions on directive-derived rights by individuals against the State – 
by adopting the widest possible definition of an emanation of the state which 
would include, for example, health authorities, decentralized administrative 
authorities and nationalized industries.11 It also created a limited case law 
“incidentally” permitting the use of unimplemented directives in horizontal 
scenarios in certain cases involving directives which did not directly impose 
legal obligations on individuals and usually involved the disapplication of 
technical standards.12 Neither of these mechanisms could be of use in 
Mangold. The directive at issue did “create…rights [and] obligations for 
individuals” and therefore it did “define the substantive scope of the legal rule 
on the basis of which the national court must decide the case before it.”13
Most relevant to Mangold is the third way round the lack of horizontal 
direct effect of directives, the concept of indirect effect: an interpretative 
obligation requiring national courts to read domestic law in such a way so as 
to conform with the provisions of directives.14 This mechanism proves 
particularly useful in cases where relevant national law exists which can be 
subject to interpretation and when the directive itself cannot be relied on, 
either because it is not sufficiently precise,15 the period of its implementation 
has not expired or where the proceedings are between private parties.16 For 
11 Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority, [1986] ECR 723; Case 103/88, Fratelli Constanzo v Milano, [1989] ECR 
1839; Case C- 188/89, Foster v British Gas plc, [1990] ECR I-3313. 
12  Case C-194/94, CIA Security SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL, [1996] ECR 
I-2201; Case C-433/98, Unilever v Central Food, [2000] ECR I-7535. 
13  Unilever, ibid note 11, at para [51]. 
14  Case 14/83, Von Colson v Land Nordhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 1891, at paras 
[26] and [28]; Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial International de 
Alimentacion, [1990] ECR I-4135, at para [8]; CaseC-397-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer 
and others  v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, at para [38].  
15  Von Colson, ibid note 13. 
16  Marleasing, ibid note 13. 
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that reason it could have been used in Mangold and in fact Advocate General 
Tizzano relies on this existing doctrine to reach his conclusion that the 
TzBfG, though contrary to Directive 2000/78, could not be disapplied but 
should be interpreted by the national courts in order to arrive at a result 
consistent with that prescribed by the Directive.17  
The law on how to deal with unimplemented directives seemed settled: 
they could not be used before their period of implementation had expired,18 
they could not be relied upon in proceedings exclusively between private 
parties,19 though national law should be interpreted as far as possible to give 
effect to their desired result.20
The Court of Justice, however, without the encouragement of its 
Advocate General, takes it upon itself to make new inroads and find yet 
another way round the lack of horizontal direct effect. 
 
The new mechanism: Equal treatment as a general principle of Community 
law 
 
The Court’s second line of reasoning in justifying its departure from what 
appeared to be settled law and allowing reliance on provisions of a directive 
before its period of implementation had expired and in an action against a 
private party, is that the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age 
was not laid down by Directive 2000/78, but is a general principle of 
Community law.21 Arguably what the Court may be suggesting is that 
although “a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual,”22 
it could do so as a result of the application of a general principle it embodies. 
It is therefore not the Directive that is applied horizontally but the general 
principle. Consequently application of this general principle cannot be 
conditional upon the expiry of the implementation period of the Directive.23 
The inspired recognition of non-discrimination on the grounds of age as a 
general principle of Community law has thus enabled the Court in one great 
leap to avoid both limitations it would have normally confronted in trying to 
apply the provisions of a directive to a case like the present. It can impose 
obligations found in directives on individuals in horizontal scenarios and it 
can do so before the implementation period has expired.  
17  Mangold, Opinion of AG Tizzano, at paras [111] –[112] and [122]. 
18  Ratti,  above  note 2. 
19  Pfeiffer,  above note13, at para [109]. 
20  Ibid at paras. [110] – [119]. 
21 Mangold, at paras. [74] – [75]. 
22 Marshall,  above note 8, at para [48]. 
23 Mangold, at para [76]. 
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The Court’s “discovery” of a general principle of non-discrimination, thus 
avoiding the issues of direct effect of directives, is rather unconvincing. It 
purports to have identified this general principle in “the third and fourth 
recitals in the preamble to the directive,”24 which interestingly make no 
specific mention to age discrimination, “in various instruments and in the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.”25 The suggestion of 
an existing general principle of non-discrimination would render the 
introduction by the Treaty of Amsterdam of a new legal basis on such non-
discrimination in art 13 EC puzzling if not redundant.  The limits of the 
principle are also unclear; will other areas of discrimination mentioned in 
Directive 2000/78 on the grounds of religion, disability and sexual orientation 
also reap the benefits of it?  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is to date no case law of the Court of Justice suggesting that general 
principles of Community law can indeed create rights and obligations in 
proceedings between individuals. It is submitted that the Court, even in this 
case, is not suggesting that they do per se, though it does seem to indicate that 
the existence of a Directive embodying such a principle, in a completely 
unprecedented way, somehow leads to the establishment of those obligations 
against individuals even in horizontal relations. What is more, it does so even 
before the period for its implementation has expired. In its attempt to find yet 
another way round the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives the Court 
has introduced further perplexity and uncertainty in this already convoluted 
area of European law. 
 
 
 
 
24 Mangold, at para [74]. 
25 Ibid. 
